Michael Rivera v. R. McCoy by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-26-2018 
Michael Rivera v. R. McCoy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"Michael Rivera v. R. McCoy" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 240. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/240 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
DLD-152        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3202 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL RIVERA, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
C.O. II SERGEANT R. MCCOY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 1-15-cv-02089) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones, III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 15, 2018 
Before:  JORDAN, SHWARTZ and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 26, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Michael Rivera, proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals from the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Sergeant Robert 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McCoy in an action Rivera brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we will only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion; these facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.  During the time 
relevant to this litigation, Rivera was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution in 
Dallas, Pennsylvania.  On January 20, 2015, Rivera assaulted a corrections officer; the 
officer lost his left eye during the attack. 
 In June or July 2015, Rivera first met McCoy at SCI Dallas.  Rivera claims that 
McCoy repeatedly threatened to take out Rivera’s eye in retaliation for the January 
assault and that McCoy threatened to fabricate misconduct reports against him.  On 
August 7 and 8, 2015, Rivera reported McCoy’s alleged threatening conduct.  Rivera’s 
grievance was denied as frivolous on August 24, 2015.  When Rivera appealed, he 
claimed to possess ten unsworn declarations of inmates who saw McCoy engage in 
threatening behavior on those dates but did not name any witnesses or submit their 
declarations. 
The Office of Special Investigations and Intelligence conducted an investigation of 
Rivera’s allegations and ultimately concluded that they were unsubstantiated.  Its ultimate 
report noted that Rivera refused to be brought to security for an interview regarding his 
allegations and that Rivera refused to identify any inmate who could provide information 
about the incidents at issue.  Rivera unsuccessfully appealed the denial of his grievance 
through all available levels. 
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On August 21, 2015, McCoy wrote a misconduct report charging Rivera with 
using abusive, obscene, or inappropriate language with him.  Rivera responded that 
McCoy had fabricated the misconduct report in retaliation for Rivera’s earlier grievance 
against him and maintained that he did not say a word to McCoy that day.  At Rivera’s 
misconduct hearing, another correctional officer testified about the incident at Rivera’s 
request but supported McCoy’s version of events.  Rivera was found guilty of the 
misconduct and sanctioned with thirty days in disciplinary custody.  His subsequent 
appeals at all levels of the grievance process were denied. 
On September 8, 2015, McCoy charged Rivera with refusing to obey an order and 
with possessing a cup in his cell, which was a contraband item.  Rivera responded that 
McCoy again falsified the report because the only item on his desk was an orange.  
Rivera did not request any witnesses for his misconduct hearing.  He was found guilty 
and sentenced to another thirty days in disciplinary custody; his administrative appeals 
were again unsuccessful. 
In October 2015, Rivera filed a complaint against McCoy in the District Court 
alleging First Amendment retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Rivera attached 
numerous unsworn declarations to his complaint by inmates who indicate that they heard 
interactions between McCoy and Rivera.  Four inmates’ declarations dated on either 
August 7 or 8, 2015 state that they heard McCoy threatening Rivera on those dates.  
Three inmates claimed to have heard McCoy threaten to falsify misconduct reports 
against Rivera on August 21.  Finally, two inmates claim to have heard McCoy demand a 
cup from Rivera on September 8 and heard Rivera respond that he did not have a cup.  
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After the parties completed discovery, McCoy moved for summary judgment.  The 
District Court granted McCoy’s motion on September 11, 2017.  Rivera timely appealed. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment.  Blunt v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).  We will “grant summary judgment 
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A genuine 
dispute of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
248 (1986).  We may summarily affirm a district court’s decision “on any basis supported 
by the record” if the appeal does not present a substantial question.  See Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
III. 
 The District Court properly granted summary judgment to McCoy on Rivera’s 
First Amendment retaliation claim.  “A prisoner alleging that prison officials have 
retaliated against him for exercising his constitutional rights must prove that: 1) the 
conduct in which he was engaged was constitutionally protected; 2) he suffered ‘adverse 
action’ at the hands of prison officials; and 3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a 
substantial or motivating factor in the decision to discipline him.”  Carter v. McGrady, 
292 F.3d 152, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2002). 
If a prisoner makes out this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the prison 
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officials to show that “they would have made the same decision absent the protected 
conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”  Rauser v. 
Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001).  “[W]e evaluate . . . ‘the quantum of evidence’ of 
the misconduct to determine whether the prison officials’ decision to discipline an inmate 
for his violations of prison policy was within the broad discretion we must afford them.”  
Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2016).  We have noted that “most 
prisoners’ retaliation claims will fail if the misconduct charges are supported by the 
evidence.”  Id. at 425. 
 The District Court concluded that Rivera had stated a prima facie case of 
retaliation but that McCoy was entitled to summary judgment because the evidence 
supported the decisions to discipline Rivera.  We agree with the District Court’s ultimate 
conclusion. 
 Two corrections officers provided consistent testimony against Rivera regarding 
the August 21 incident, including one officer called as a witness by Rivera.1  For the 
September 8 incident, the hearing examiner concluded that McCoy’s account was more 
believable than Rivera’s.  Rivera did not call any witnesses for that hearing and none of 
                                              
1  At his deposition, Rivera testified that the officer he had called as a witness told him 
before the misconduct hearing that he could not truthfully recount what had happened.  
Rivera did not mention this issue at his hearing or in his administrative appeals.  Rivera 
testified that other inmates witnessed this statement, but none of the unsworn statements 
he attached to his complaint recounted it.  Further, it is not clear how this classic hearsay 
— an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, see Fed. R. 
Evid. 801(c) — is capable of being admitted at trial, a prerequisite for consideration at 
summary judgment.  See Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Sys., Inc., 63 F.3d 
1267, 1275 n.17 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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the unsworn witness declarations attached to his complaint indicate that the authors 
personally observed what Rivera had on his desk.  Rivera also did not offer any witness 
statements as supporting evidence at any stage of the administrative grievance process for 
either misconduct charge despite supposedly having ten of them in his possession.  In this 
case, there is a sufficient quantum of evidence of misconduct to demonstrate that the 
discipline imposed on Rivera was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests 
and that he would have been disciplined regardless of his grievance against McCoy.  See 
Watson, 834 F.3d at 426.  Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment.  Rivera’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied as moot. 
 
 
 
